Case studies show that corporate managers seek financial independence to avoid interference by outside financiers. We incorporate this financial xenophobia as a fixed cost in a simple dynamic model of financing and investment. To avoid refinancing in the future, the firm alters its behavior depending on the extent of its financial xenophobia and the realization of a revenue shock. With a sufficiently adverse shock, the firm holds no liquidity. Otherwise, the firm precautionarily saves and holds both liquidity and external finance. Investment always responds to neoclassical fundamentals, but responds to cash flow only when the firm holds no liquidity.
Introduction
Two prominent features of the investment and finance decisions of US firms set the stage for our investigation. First, firms finance the vast majority of their capital expenditures internally rather than using external finance in the form of debt and equity.
According to the Flow of Funds Accounts, in each year between 1980 and 2000 at least two-thirds of corporate capital expenditures were financed using internal funds.
1 Second, firms build liquid resources in excess of their current investment needs. According to S&P Compustat, over the same period publicly-traded US firms held on average about one-year's worth of net cash flow as liquidity.
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In this paper we explore an intuitive reason why firms might hold liquidity and use it to finance investment, namely that managers put themselves in a vulnerable position when they go outside the firm to acquire new resources. There is substantial evidence to support this conjecture. According to Donaldson's (1984) case studies of top managers in large US corporations, one of management's overriding concerns is interference by outside financiers, a concern we call financial xenophobia. One executive of a Fortune 250 company summarized it this way: ''The debt policy [of our company] reflects a primary emphasis on freedom -that if we maintain the debt limits we have set, we will be free from banking restrictions and the banks will not inhibit our activities.'' (p. 56)
The financial strategy that emerges from management's desire for independence can best be characterized as one of self-sufficiency. When managers control their financing, the timing, magnitude, and form of investment remain theirs to decide. This imposes the need to live within financial limits:
The wish to be independent and self-sufficient moderates the management's drive for maximum corporate growth by restricting the pool of available capital. For example, management may decide to forgo certain external sources of funds because they threaten to involve outsiders in resource-allocation decisions. Or it may fear to accept funds that seem likely to be withdrawn at a critical point in the firm's strategic development. Thus corporate managers trade off maximum economic scale for greater control of their resources and/or greater assurance that those resources will be loyal...These issues are central to management's strategic use of debt finance and they may apply to equity sources as well. (p. 24).
In practical terms this means that managers rely on internal funds whenever they can, supplemented by debt conservatively chosen to assure an arm's-length debtor-creditor relationship. Only as a last resort do managers use equity financing. As we have already mentioned, this financial pecking order is a well-established empirical regularity.
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From an agency-theoretic perspective it is natural to expect financial xenophobia:
managers are self-interested, which gives them good reason to resent the limits to their control of corporate resources imposed by outside financiers. This is spelled out in Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, which argues that unfettered management will invest the firm's excess financial resources in projects that are not in the outsiders' best interest. While undoubtedly there is truth in this, we think this rather Hobbesian view of management has been overemphasized.
A more balanced perspective recognizes that despite the conflict of interest between managers and outside financiers, both parties contribute to the firm and share the overriding goal of assuring the business' vitality. The fundamental way in which the two parties differ is in how closely they are tied to the firm. To run the day-to-day operations of the firm, the manager has to invest in human capital that is specific to the firm. In contrast to the outsiders, who have a largely liquid investment, the manager's investment is sunk. In the absence of complete contracts, this personal commitment exposes the manager to a hold-up problem since outsiders may be able to expropriate the return from her investment. Thus, agency costs are likely to cut both ways: just as the manager can divert resources inside the firm from what the outsiders consider their best use, the opposite is true as well.
A rational response by the manager to this type of hold-up problem is to put less human capital into the firm. Therefore, to the extent that outsiders benefit from managerial initiative, interference decreases the value of the firm. Hence, we emphasize that there must be important benefits to granting the manager at least some control over corporate resources. 4 But contractual incompleteness is likely to prevent the use of explicit agreements that commit outsiders to leaving the manager alone. In this case, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) argue that the public-good nature of shareholder activism allows a dispersed ownership structure to serve as a commitment device and to implement a balance of power between the manager and outsiders so that the firm can be run more efficiently (see also Myers 2000) . However, these everyday corporate control mechanisms may break down when the manager seeks additional external finance, since it then makes good sense for outsiders to increase their scrutiny of the firm. After all, on one the hand, it may be good news that management needs additional funding for profitable investment projects. On the other, it may be bad news if management has failed to generate sufficient profits because it invested too much, too little, or simply unwisely. Hence, when managers are forced to turn to outsiders for new resources, they expose themselves to the risk of losing benefits from their past investment in the firm.
5
We study how financially xenophobic managers make finance and investment decisions by assuming that they face a fixed cost of increasing external finance. This fixed cost is a simple way to capture the idea that seeking external finance can exacerbate the conflict of interest between managers and outsiders. We leave the formal modeling of the underlying hold-up problem between managers and outsiders for a separate investigation, focusing instead on its implications for the firm's financing and investment decisions. 6 We find that financial xenophobia has remarkable effects on the firm's optimal investment and financing even in the absence of risk aversion, limited liability, irreversible physical capital, and differences in risk between physical capital and liquidity. Not surprisingly, the financial adjustment cost introduces the type of inertia in the firm's contemporaneous financing policy suggested by Donaldson: refinancing may not be undertaken even though an additional dollar could be profitably invested inside the firm. The more interesting effect comes from the specter of refinancing in the future.
In order to avoid seeking new financing in the subsequent period, the firm changes its current behavior, both in terms of the total amount of resources held and in terms of their composition. These distortions depend on the level of the manager's financial xenophobia as well as on the realization of a revenue shock.
Firms that have experienced a sufficiently favorable shock do not repay external finance, instead they precautionarily save by accumulating idle liquidity. Greater financial xenophobia strengthens the incentive to hold idle liquidity. In contrast, firms that have experienced a sufficiently adverse shock hold no liquidity. They may, however, precautionarily save by overinvesting in capital.
While investment is always responsive to neoclassical fundamentals, it is affected by current cash flow only in some circumstances. When firms hold liquidity, cash has no effect on either the capital stock or external finance. When firms do not hold liquidity, their optimal choices of both investment and external finance respond to an additional dollar of cash, which is split between capital investment and the repayment of external finance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. In sections three and four we solve the model first in the absence of, then in the presence of, financial xenophobia. In section five we discuss our findings and relate them to those in the literature. The final section concludes. The appendix contains the proofs of the propositions.
Model
We use a three-period model in which the manager chooses in each period the firm's capital stock, external finance, and liquidity holding. Since the decision problem entails a fixed cost, we adopt this simplified dynamic framework because it admits an analytic solution. We first derive the optimal decisions in the absence of financial xenophobia.
In this benchmark, the manager acts in the interests of the owners by maximizing the expected discounted value of future profits. We then analyze how a manager who faces a fixed cost of refinancing runs the firm.
We make several assumptions to simplify the analysis and to focus on the issues that are material to our investigation. First, we assume that the manager is risk-neutral.
It is important to highlight this assumption since the xenophobic manager's optimal decisions resemble in some ways those that would be made by a risk-averse manager.
In particular, sometimes the manager will precautionarily save by accumulating internal resources despite her risk-neutrality. Second, we are primarily interested in the distinction between internal and external finance, not in the composition of external finance. We therefore assume only a single source of external finance. Third, the manager controls the firm's liquidity except for a variable cost of funds to service external finance. We make this assumption to focus the analysis on the manager's use of discretionary control over financial resources. We leave the exact delineation of that control until we better understand the simplest case. 7 Finally, we do not explicitly consider limited liability because its effects are relatively well understood.
Production Technology
Physical capital, K, is the sole factor of production. We normalize the price of output to unity and the price of investment is p. Revenue from production, Π(K t ), is strictly increasing and strictly concave, with Π(0) = 0, Π (0) = ∞, and Π (∞) = 0. There is a stochastic revenue shock, z t , which is additive and independently and identically distributed (iid) with a density function f (z t ). As a result, cash flow from operations at time t is the sum of the shock z t and revenue from production Π(K t ). The additivity allows us to contrast the features of our model with a benchmark in which the shock has no effect on the optimal policy. While this representation might seem too restrictive, in fact, it makes our results all the more surprising: Firms hold cash even though they have access to a risk-free productive asset.
Capital evolves according to the accounting identity:
If external finance is interpreted as equity, this assumption is tantamount to precluding any flexibility in dividend payments. where δ is the constant rate of economic depreciation, and I is investment. Apart from depreciation, investment in capital is completely reversible.
Financial Technology
A common view is that the source of financing affects investment decisions. This is captured in models in which there is asymmetric information between the firm's management and its outside financiers. In these models, external funds are more expensive at the margin than internal funds (see Hubbard 1998 for a survey). When investment opportunities require additional external finance, firms will underinvest because of the premium outsiders charge. Moreover, investment is liquidity-constrained in the sense that an extra dollar of cash relaxes the financing constraint, enabling more investment.
We use this type of model as a baseline and augment it with financial xenophobia.
The firm can invest its liquid financial resources, L t , and earn a rate of return of i. The discount factor is therefore β = 1/(1 + i). The firm also has access to external finance, D t , at the cost r (D t ). We assume that r (D t ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, reflecting the risk premium that outsiders charge the firm, and that r (0) = i. Moreover, to enable the firm to dynamically manage its financing we assume that external finance is long-term and does not have to be repaid after one period.
In the introduction we presented some evidence suggesting that managers face a cost when they get new financing. We model such financial xenophobia as a fixed cost of acquiring, but not retiring, external finance:
More generally, this cost could depend on the size of the firm, its ability to repay, or even more ephemeral factors, such as management's reputation. While it might be interesting to extend our model in these directions, our simple function captures the key insight that we want to model. 8 Certain types of financing may well impose smaller costs on the manager than others. For example, short-term debt used to finance seasonal inventory fluctuations is likely to impose a small, or even negligible, fixed cost. We abstract away from this heterogeneity as well. 
The Decision Problem
The timing of the decision problem is illustrated in figure 1 . At the beginning of each period the firm inherits the state variables D t , K t , and L t . The firm services its external finance, r (D t )D t , and receives interest from its liquid resources, iL t . Production and the stochastic shock generate cash flow from operations, Π(K t ) + z t . These financial and real activities plus the market value of the completely liquid surviving capital stock define the firm's internal funds,
Finally, at the end of the period the manager chooses next period's stocks of external finance and capital, subject to the fixed cost µ, if applicable. Outgoing liquidity is a residual, defined as the sum of internal funds and new external finance, less the cost of investment:
The only exception is period 3, which closes with the liquidation of the firm.
The manager's payoff in each period is just equal to outgoing liquidity -defined in equation (1) -net of the cost to her from refinancing:
The manager's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of current and expected future payoffs defined by equation (2). Using backward induction to solve this problem gives the following per-period decision problem where optimal future decisions are denoted by an asterisk:
subject to
The first constraint forces investment to be less than or equal to the amount of available resources, which could include new financing. The second constraint forces external finance to be non-negative.
Solution Without Financial Xenophobia
To establish a benchmark, we first characterize the optimal financing and investment decisions under the assumption that there is no financial xenophobia (µ = 0). The optimal policy is to acquire or maintain external funds only to the extent that they can be profitably invested in physical capital. This policy is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The investment and financing decisions of the firm in any period can be characterized in terms of two regions of values of C t .
(1) When C t is sufficiently small, the firm holds external finance, but no liquidity. The optimal capital stock and external finance are given jointly by the first constraint (equation (4)), which holds with equality, and the following marginal condition:
(2) When C t is sufficiently large, the firm holds liquidity, but no external finance. The optimal capital stock is implicitly defined by
The stock of liquidity is given as a residual by equation (1)
.
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Figure 2: Optimal Investment and Financing Decisions Without Financial Xenophobia
These optimality conditions are familiar: the optimal capital stock is determined by its marginal revenue product and by the cost of capital, which is a function of the price of capital, its depreciation rate, and the stock of external finance through the cost of funds. Since the cost of funds is strictly increasing in the amount of external finance, the optimal capital stock decreases with the firm's external finance.
We use figure 2 to illustrate the solution to the problem in terms of internal funds.
Bad shocks reduce internal funds (labeled cash for shorthand), causing the cost-offunds curve to shift to the left. In this situation, an extra dollar of cash is split between investment and paying down external finance. This is the sense in which investment is liquidity constrained. When the firm has enough internal funds to pay off completely its external finance, its cost-of-funds curve has shifted to the right so that the optimal capital stock is independent of internal funds. In this situation, an extra dollar of cash accumulates in the firm. But this accumulation is not a choice in any meaningful sense since liquidity is only a residual. In summary, absent financial xenophobia the firm never simultaneously maintains external finance and liquidity.
Solution With Financial Xenophobia

Periods Two and Three
Consider next the case in which the manager is financially xenophobic (µ > 0). In the third period, the manager has no decision to make since the firm is exogenously forced into liquidation. There is no limited liability, so the entire liquidation value, be it positive or negative, enters the manager's payoff for period three. The liquidation value is equal to internal funds, C 3 , minus external finance, D 3 .
In the second period, the manager must weigh the discrete cost of getting new financing, µ > 0, against the net benefit of doing so, which is determined by the capital stock, K 2 , the stock of external finance, D 2 , and the amount of internal funds, C 2 .
After the manager has incurred the fixed cost of refinancing in period two, there are no future refinancing decisions. Hence, Proposition 1 describes the manager's financing and investment decisions if she acquires new external finance.
To determine whether the manager refinances in period two we compare the total net benefit from acquiring external finance and investing it in physical capital to that from settling for the capital stock that can be financed internally, denoted byK 3 = p −1 C 2 :
The two bracketed expressions capture the financial and real effects, respectively, of refinancing. In the financial sector, the increased stock of external finance is paid for, the cost of carrying the existing external finance increases, and the (compounded) fixed cost of refinancing is incurred. In the real sector, the firm enjoys revenue from a larger capital stock, but also pays for this investment.
The function H 2 defines a threshold level of internal funds,Ĉ 2 , that triggers refinancing. As long as C 2 ≥Ĉ 2 , the manager refrains from refinancing. But when C 2 falls belowĈ 2 , the capital stock that can be internally financed,K 3 , has shrunk to the point where the marginal revenue product of capital is high enough to warrant incurring the fixed cost. This decision rule is summarized in Proposition 2. According to Proposition 2, the contemporaneous refinancing cost does not affect the firm's behavior when internal funds fall below the thresholdĈ 2 or when they exceed the level that makes it possible to internally finance the capital stock that is optimal when external financing is unchanged at D 2 . However, for intermediate levels of internal funds, the fixed financial adjustment cost introduces financial inertia and under-investment in capital. Finally, it is worth pointing out that ifĈ 2 ≤ C 2 < 0, then the deficit is eliminated by selling capital. 
Period One
In the first period, the manager's decision problem is complicated by the specter of future costs of refinancing. The manager may be able to decrease the risk of incurring these costs by accumulating excess resources inside the firm. Such behavior is akin to saving precautionarily. As a result, both real and financial decision-making are distorted.
The risk of incurring the cost of refinancing in period two can be derived from the optimal refinancing policy described in Proposition 2: the cost will be incurred if and only if C 2 <Ĉ 2 . We map this condition into the space of realizations of the revenue shock, callingẑ 2 the critical value of the shock that triggers refinancing. For all realizations of z 2 <ẑ 2 , the firm must incur the cost of refinancing, so the probability of this event is equal to:
In Lemma 1, the marginal effects of the period one decision variables, D 2 and K 2 , on the expected future cost of refinancing are derived using Leibnitz's Rule.
These two effects on the expected cost of refinancing are critical elements in the model, so we highlight the economic intuition behind them. The manager's decisions affect neither the magnitude of the refinancing cost, µ, nor the probability distribution of the revenue shocks, f (z). The only remaining channel is through the threshold-level of the revenue shock that triggers refinancing in the subsequent period,ẑ 2 .
An increase in external finance in period one has three effects onẑ 2 in equation (7).
First, additional external finance increases internal funds in period two by the face value of the added finance plus the return that it earns. This enables the firm to absorb a less favorable shock, thus decreasing the threshold that triggers refinancing. Second, additional external finance must be serviced, although not paid-in-full, which decreases internal funds and therefore increasesẑ 2 . Finally, additional external finance increases the cost of servicing the existing stock of external finance in period two by r (D 2 )D 2 .
This effect increasesẑ 2 by making it less costly, and therefore more attractive, to refinance in period two.
An increase in the outgoing capital stock, K 2 , has three effects onẑ 2 in equation (8).
First, an additional unit of capital generates revenue of Π (K 2 ) in period two which boosts internal funds and decreasesẑ 2 . Second, buying capital in period one decreases internal funds in period two by p(1 + i), which increasesẑ 2 . Finally, an additional unit of capital in period one increases the liquidation value of the existing capital stock in period two by p (1−δ) . This means that a larger capital stock can be financed internally, which makes refinancing less urgent and decreasesẑ 2 . Combining the latter two effects yields the standard rental cost of internally financed capital, p(i + δ).
The heart of the manager's decision problem in period one is the trade-off between future refinancing costs and direct effects on cash-flow. This comparison is captured by the following parameter, which measures the relative importance of the future refinancing cost in the manager's objective function:
The parameter φ lies between 0 and 1 and is strictly increasing in µ and in f (ẑ 2 ). This makes it natural to interpret φ as a firm-specific parameter measuring the extent of management's financial xenophobia: the higher the fixed cost of accessing external finance, the higher is φ.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 describe the manager's optimal finance and investment policies in period one, which take into account the expected cost of future refinancing. 
Compared to optimal investment without financial xenophobia, over-investment occurs when internal funds are sufficiently large to satisfy the following condition:
(2) When C 1 >C 1 , the firm holds both liquidity and external finance. The optimal capital stock and external finance are given jointly by the following two marginal conditions:
Investment is unaffected by financial xenophobia. The stock of liquidity is given as a residual by equation (1).C 1 is given by the first constraint (equation (4)) when it
holds with equality.
Corollary 1:
(1)C 1 is strictly decreasing in φ and approaches infinity as φ approaches zero. The manager's optimal decisions when C 1 <C 1 are illustrated in Figure 3 on the following page. Compared to the case of no financial xenophobia, the expected future cost of refinancing shifts the curve representing the net marginal cost of external funds,
. This distortion term captures the effect of an additional dollar of external finance in period one on the firm's refinancing decision in period two: another dollar of resources is available, but part of the increased cost of external finance is sunk in period one, making refinancing in period two more attractive.
Whether there is over-or under-investment relative to the case without financial xenophobia depends on the sign of the distortion term. When C 1 is large enough, the distortion term is positive so the net marginal cost of external funds shifts down, resulting in over-investment. This is the case we depict in Figure 3 . As C 1 falls, pr (D 2 )D 2 increases without bound, discouraging saving precautionarily in capital.
Intuition therefore suggests that the firm may underinvest when internal funds are When C 1 <C 1 and the firm is liquidity-constrained, both real and financial decisions are responsive to changes in the firm's cash position. An increase in internal funds is split between investment and repayment of external finance because the marginal benefit of liquidity is only i. Moreover, the firm's behavior is also responsive to changes in neoclassical fundamentals through the net marginal revenue product of capital. since the marginal benefit of repaying external finance falls short of that of holding cash by φ when D 2 = 0. Therefore, for all C 1 >C 1 , liquidity dominates the retirement of external financing, so the firm will keep its stock of external finance fixed. Moreover, it will not adjust its capital stock either. When the firm starts to hold liquidity atC 1 , the opportunity cost of funds for capital investment, which can now be provided internally, r K 2 To close the model, the value of the frictionless optimal decision derived in Proposition 3 must be compared to the fixed cost of refinancing in period one. To analyze this problem, we define the net benefit to refinancing in period one:
The integration-term represents the benefit from a decreased risk of refinancing in the subsequent period. It is never optimal to refinance if the additional resources will be held as cash, i.e., H 1 is strictly negative for all C 1 ≥C 1 . Moreover, H 1 is strictly decreasing in internal funds, C 1 , and therefore also in the revenue shock, z 1 , 
Discussion
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) present some stylized facts about liquidity holding and investment. First, most liquid assets are held by a subset of firms (see also Schnure 1998) . Second, firms generate their liquidity internally. Third, firms use liquidity as insurance against future adverse shocks rather than to fund investment or to repay external financial obligations. As a result, the investment and financial policies of firms with idle liquidity are unresponsive to contemporaneous shocks to internal funds.
The key predictions of our model are consistent with these stylized facts. We show that a firm may hold idle liquidity even though its financial return is inferior to that of repaying external finance. Absent financial xenophobia, other models do not generate this type of liquidity holding. As we demonstrated in our baseline model, a risk premium on external finance (stemming from, for example, adverse selection or moral hazard) generates liquidity holding only when all external financial obligations are paidin-full. 10 Jensen's free-cash-flow model and the earlier literature on empire-building managers (see, e.g., Baumol 1959 , Marris 1964 , Williamson 1964 ) rationalize the hoarding of resources, but cannot explain why managers hold them as idle liquidity instead of investing them for their own benefit. Moreover, we show that financially xenophobic firms generate liquidity internally and use it as insurance, leaving optimal investment and financial policies unaffected by shocks to contemporaneous cash flow.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that our model is stripped of many important features. We deliberately assumed that there is no risk, time-to-build, or adjustment costs in the investment technology because these assumptions seem least likely to favor liquidity holding. The compromise inherent in this approach is that the predictions about the firm's optimal investment policy lack robustness. For example, risk and partial irreversibility can generate an option value to waiting to invest. This might be a source of underinvestment.
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In terms of the financial technology, one notable assumption is that the marginal cost of external finance is deterministic. Relaxing this assumption, however, is not sufficient to generate liquidity holding in the absence of financial xenophobia. As long as the stochastic cost of external finance exceeds the return to idle liquidity, it is strictly preferable to repay in the current period as much external finance as possible and, if need be, refinance tomorrow.
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A well-functioning market for corporate control might temper the financially xenophobic manager's desire to hold idle cash. The reason is that cash, which is an asset that is not firm-specific, makes the firm a more attractive target for takeovers. However, due to transaction costs -generated, for example, by the free-rider problem pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1980) -the firm would in all likelihood have some room to hold cash (see, e.g., Nickell 1995, chapter 2). In addition, in our model the firms that 10 Recall that the baseline model collapses to the standard neoclassical one when investment is internally financed. Since internal finance is empirically the dominant source of investment finance, this model therefore leaves no role for financing considerations in most investment decisions.
11 It is worth pointing out, however, that irreversibility distorts only the investment policy. It cannot generate liquidity holding by itself since paying back external finance remains strictly preferable in the absence of some other distortion like financial xenophobia.
12 If the firm has multi-period financial obligations that specify a time-invariant marginal cost schedule, then it may make sense to hoard liquidity when funds are relatively cheap. It is, however, difficult to conceive why any financier would agree to such a financial contract since it generates an expected loss.
hold cash are those which are successful. This connection should serve as an automatic partial takeover defense.
The central assumption of our model is that the manager incurs a fixed cost when she increases, but not when she decreases, outside financing. An important building block of a theoretical foundation for this financial friction is provided by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) (BGP), who argue that granting managers independence can be efficient because it gives them stronger incentives to contribute to the firm.
BGP point out that shareholders can credibly commit not to interfere by owning small stakes in the firm. However, what BGP do not consider is that the temptation to interfere may be stronger in certain circumstances. In particular, the empirical evidence we discussed in the introduction suggests that seeking additional external finance makes the firm more susceptible to direct control by outsiders. In these circumstances, the run-of-the-mill commitment devices emphasized by BGP may not suffice. Therefore, to avoid such break-down situations, insiders and outsiders should agree to grant the manager partial financial independence. Access to internal finance appears to be an attractive way to achieve this end since internal cash flow is correlated with the efficient management of the firm.
The idea that productive arrangements are particularly fragile in some economic circumstances is emphasized by Ramey and Watson (1997) . They study employment relationships under the assumption that both employer and employee can engage in opportunistic behavior. Their perspective reinforces our view that corporate outsiders pose a threat to the contributions of the insiders as well as the other way around.
den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1999) build on this idea, showing that liquidity shocks can trigger inefficient severance of lending relationships. They provide a convincing argument that firms suffer when they are dependent on external finance. However, in den Haan et al. (1999) firms are passive as they cannot avoid this cost. In our model, managers actively seek financial independence to avoid the threat posed by outside financiers.
Our hypothesis about financial friction is also related to the literature on how financial contracts can help realign the interests of managers and their outside constituencies. Much of the recent research on financial contracts has focused on the control properties of financial contracts. From this perspective, the defining feature of debt is that it allows for a transfer of control from the manager to outside financiers in some circumstances, namely bankruptcy, but not in others. 13 The manager in our model is not afraid of bankruptcy in the normal sense, but rather of losing some of her decisionmaking authority when she is forced to refinance; refinancing constitutes a partial, not full, transfer of control because it triggers a renegotiation between the manager and the outside financiers. This type of state-contingent renegotiation of financial contracts has been studied by Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) , in particular with respect to how this flexibility ex post may hurt the firm's ability to precommit ex ante to repaying its financiers. Our idea is similar, except it concerns the opposite problem: renegotiation hampers the firm's financiers from credibly promising the manager to let her reap the benefits from her firm-specific investments.
Turning to the investment literature, Gomes (1999) analyzes investment decisions under uncertainty, but restricts firms to using only current period profits or external funds to finance their investment. By assuming that all of the firm's internal funds are flushed out of it at the end of each period, Gomes allows no meaningful role for internal finance through the retention of profits. The study closest in spirit to ours is Gross (1995) , in which the firm's financial history also determines the effect, if any, of financial frictions on its investment and financing decisions. However, the economics of Gross' analysis is quite different from that of ours. First, Gross adapts a buffer-stock model of consumption to study investment, so it is bankruptcy that generates a benefit from hoarding resources inside the firm. Second, in Gross' model capital is a risky asset, which is why the firm underinvests and holds cash as insurance against bankruptcy.
Finally, Gross' firm, like the firm in our baseline model, cannot simultaneously hold liquidity and external finance. In Gross' model, using cash to repay external finance has no lasting consequences; in ours, using cash to repay external finance exposes the firm to the vagaries of external financiers.
Conclusion
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that financing has important effects on investment (see, e.g., Hubbard 1998 and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999) . This makes it important to explicitly model how different types of financial frictions affect investment and financing over time. We have highlighted an empirically plausible friction: that managers suffer a fixed cost when they seek additional financing. Modeling financial xenophobia in this way generates two particularly interesting results. First, we show that the financially xenophobic manager may choose to hold liquidity and external finance simultaneously, a stylized fact that is not easily explained by existing models. Second, in this situation the financially xenophobic manager channels an extra dollar of cash into idle liquidity even though she has the seemingly superior alternative of repaying external finance.
The model is highly stylized. First, it lacks a model of the conflict of interest between the manager and outside financiers that generates financial xenophobia. Explicit consideration of this may reveal a more complex structure than the fixed cost that we assume. Second, we have assumed that the revenue shock is iid and additive. Relaxing the iid assumption may help in fitting data, but it is unlikely to change the qualitative conclusions; relaxing the additivity assumption will affect the character of the model. 
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: When there is no financial xenophobia (µ = 0) the first-order conditions for the problem defined by equations (3), (4), and (5) are:
When D t+1 > 0, λ 2 = 0. In this case, we can solve for λ 1 using the first-order condition for external finance (equation (11)):
Since λ 1 > 0, the first constraint (equation (4)) holds with equality, which means that the firm holds no liquidity. K * t+1 and D * t+1 are determined jointly by the first constraint (equation (4)) and the following marginal optimality condition, which is derived by substituting the solution for λ 1 (equation (12)) into equation (10):
In this case, we can solve for λ 1 and λ 2 using the first-order condition for external finance (equation (11)):
The multipliers must be non-negative so λ 1 = λ 2 = 0. Since λ 1 = 0, we can solve for the optimal capital stock using equation (10):
The firm's liquidity holding is determined as a residual using the first constraint (equation (4)).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Differentiate H 2 , defined in equation (6), with respect to
The capital stock that can be financed internally,K 3 , increases with C 2 . It reaches its minimum of zero when There are two cases to consider:
(1) C 2 <Ĉ 2 . In this case, the firm refinances. The fixed cost of refinancing is sunk so Proposition 1 describes the optimal behavior when D * 3 > 0.
(2) C 2 ≥Ĉ 2 . In this case, the optimal behavior depends on the realization of C 2 . When C 2 is sufficient to finance the capital stock that is optimal when external finance is equal to D 2 , Proposition 1 describes the optimal behavior. When C 2 is insufficient to finance this optimal capital stock, the firm invests as much as possible, holds no liquidity, and external finance remains at D 2 .
Proof of Lemma 1:
Since both µ and the density function are independent of the period-one decision variables, Leibnitz's rule implies that
. The same argument applies to the derivative with respect to K 2 .
Next, differentiate H 2 with respect to z 2 , K 2 , and D 2 .
We use the Implicit Function Theorem to complete the proof:
Proof of Proposition 3:
When there is financial xenophobia (µ > 0) the first-order conditions for the problem defined by equations (3), (4), and (5) in period one are:
There are three cases to consider.
When D 2 = 0, λ 1 ≥ 0 and λ 2 ≥ 0. In this case, we can solve for λ 1 and λ 2 using the first-order condition for external finance (equation (14)):
This is a contradiction, which rules out the possibility that the optimal stock of external finance is equal to zero.
When L 2 > 0 and D 2 > 0, λ 1 = 0 and λ 2 = 0. The optimal capital stock and external finance is given jointly by the two first-order conditions. Start with the first-order condition with respect to capital (equation (13)):
Next, consider the first order condition with respect to external finance (equation (14) The firm's liquidity holding is determined as a residual using the first constraint (equation (4)).
When L 2 = 0 and D 2 > 0, λ 1 ≥ 0 and λ 2 = 0. Start by solving for λ 1 using the first order condition for external finance (equation (14)):
Since λ 1 > 0, the first constraint (equation (4) Differentiate G 1 with respect to C 1 and with respect to φ:
∂D 
(2) This statement follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3.
(3) This statement follows from the fact that optimal solutions for external finance and capital are independent of C 1 when C 1 >C 1 . It therefore suffices to establish that the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of the last inequality is positive.
